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Abstract
In late 2001, the Australian government put asylum seek-
ers at the centre of its re-election campaign by refusing to
accept 438 asylum seekers picked up by the Norwegian
cargo ship Tampa. It then introduced legislation giving
the Commonwealth powers to interdict asylum seekers at
sea, and to forcibly return them to the port of embarka-
tion. These measures extend the punitive regime of man-
datory detention in privately owned and operated centres.
This paper examines recent legislative and identity politics
in the context of the long-standing white Australian fear
of invasion from the north.
Résumé
Vers la fin de l’année 2001, le gouvernement australien
plaça les demandeurs d’asile au centre de sa campagne
électorale pour un nouveau mandat en refoulant 438 de-
mandeurs d’asile recueillis par le navire cargo Tampa. Le
gouvernement déposa ensuite un projet de loi conférant
au Commonwealth des pouvoirs accrus lui permettant de
stopper des demandeurs d’asile en haute mer et de les
reconduire de force à leur port d’embarquement. Ces me-
sures étendent aussi la politique répressive de détention
obligatoire dans des centres appartenant au secteur privé
et exploités par le secteur privé. Cet article se penche sur
les politiques législatives et identitaires récentes dans le
contexte de la crainte qu’ont les australiens de race
blanche de longue date d’une invasion venant du nord.
Introduction and Political Context
A
ustralian social researcher Hugh MacKay regularly
convenes focus groups to test the national mood and
gauge the temperature of certain issues. His July
meetings with voters indicated “strong…passions aroused
by fears of illegal immigrants” from which he concluded that
the government’s new policy of rejecting asylum seekers is
“a calculated attempt to inflame those fears and heighten our
sense of insecurity for blatant political purposes.”1 The new
policy was a response to the “Tampa crisis” of August and
September during which the Australian government refused
to allow 438 mainly Afghan asylum seekers to land on
Australian soil, a decision which involved the Australian
Special Air Services (SAS) taking command of the Norwe-
gian container vessel the MV Tampa. The Tampa, at the
request of Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR), had
picked up the asylum seekers from a small wooden fishing
boat seventy-five nautical miles from Christmas Island
(Australia) and 246 nautical miles from the Indonesian port
of Merak on August 26. AusSAR instructed the captain of
the Tampa, Arne Rinnan, to sail for Merak where permission
to land the asylum seekers had been given by the Indonesia
Search and Rescue Authority. However, the asylum seekers
protested this course of action and threatened the captain
and his crew. Rinnan contacted authorities at AusSAR, told
them of the situation and met no opposition to his request
to make for Christmas Island. He was told to anchor offshore
once he arrived and await customs officials. But in the early
hours of August  27, a Department  of Immigration  and
Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) official acting on instructions
from the secretary of the Prime Minister’s department, con-
tacted Rinnan, threatened charges for breaches of the Mi-
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gration Act, and instructed Rinnan to sail for Indonesia.
However, Rinnan anchored his ship just outside Australian
waters and waited while a heated argument developed be-
tween the Australian and Norwegian governments. Rinnan’s
repeated requests that a doctor be sent to the ship were
ignored by the Australian government. Concerned about the
deteriorating health of the asylum seekers aboard his ship
and determined to secure medical assistance, Rinnan con-
tacted the harbourmaster at Flying Fish Cove, Christmas
Island, late in the morning of August 29 and informed him
he was sailing into Australian waters. Within half an hour,
the Prime Minister, John Howard, instructed the SAS to
board and secure the ship, which was done by the early
afternoon. Finally, on the evening of August 29, Rinnan,
increasingly concerned about the health of the asylum seek-
ers and their psychological state, sent an emergency “pan-
pan” call, second only to a mayday call in its seriousness. An
SAS doctor was provided and after about an hour concluded
that no one on board was sufficiently ill to warrant being
brought ashore.2
But this three-day stand off was just the beginning of the
Tampa affair. While the government succeeded in passing
new  legislation  that makes it more  difficult for asylum
seekers to enter Australia and reduces their access to legal
remedies once they have, it was not before the Federal Court
became involved, and a High Court challenge to the legis-
lation, ultimately unsuccessful, was announced by a private
Australian citizen. Moreover, the Australian government
has had a very public disagreement with the government of
Norway, suffered severe damage to its diplomatic relations
with Indonesia, and has suffered public and private criti-
cism from the United Nations. Its attempts to prevent
asylum  seekers  reaching Australia by  diverting them to
other countries for processing are continuing and currently
involve Nauru and Papua New Guinea. The government of
Kiribati also offered its services while the Fijian government
finally rejected an Australian government request to house
and process asylum seekers.3 Most significant, perhaps, has
been the capitulation of the Australian Labor Party to gov-
ernment-fuelled populist outrage concerning the “flood” of
asylum seekers entering Australia. It has, with very few
quibbles, supported the government’s legislation and its
new policy of, where possible, refusing to allow asylum
seekers to land on Australian soil.
Just over two weeks after the so-called Tampa crisis
began, a journalist attempted to calculate the cost of the
operation to that point. He estimated expenditure of be-
tween A$70 million and A$112 million, or approximately
A$160,000 per head on the asylum seekers. This is between
twice and 3.3 times as much as it would have cost to land
and process the asylum seekers in the normal way.4 That the
government could revitalize its flagging electoral fortunes
while spending what appears to be a disproportionately
large sum of money when a “decidedly bleak” mood of
disenchantment with it prevailed reveals a great deal about
the state of identity politics in contemporary Australia.5
Indeed, the “crisis” has provoked extraordinary political
passions in Australia. Prior to being overwhelmed as a news
event by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, newspaper based chat-rooms reported unprece-
dented volumes of correspondence and participation,
much of it bitter and polarized. But the new policy of simply
refusing to accept asylum seekers arriving by boat appears
to be a political master stroke on the part of the Prime
Minister, with newspaper and television polls consistently
indicating overwhelming support for his actions. Cynical
or not, John Howard’s decision to stand up to the so-called
illegals and queue jumpers continues his government’s
practice of applying the test of “national interest” to all
instances in which “internationalist” co-operation or gen-
erosity is required.6 Moreover, that the Australian govern-
ment rejected UNHCR assurances that the Tampa “crisis”
could be “solved very quickly” because Norway, the U.S.,
New Zealand, and Sweden had agreed to accept asylum
seekers who qualified as refugees, indicates that human
welfare may have been sacrificed for potential political
gain.7
This article argues that the vilification of asylum seekers
continues a discursive practice with origins in colonial
Australia. Fears of invasion, of being swamped or over-
whelmed by an Asian world routinely perceived as restive
and hostile, have regularly characterized Australian debates
about its future. The sight of even relatively small numbers
of asylum seekers landing on Australian soil dissipates con-
fidence that the qualities that define Australian national
identity can survive, and swiftly undermines the oft-heard
claims  that Australians  support  the  underdog,  are  pro-
foundly egalitarian, and insist on a “fair go” for everyone.8
Moreover, despite the relatively small numbers of asylum
seekers that have arrived by boat since the first five people
arrived in Darwin harbour in April 1976, they have re-
mained the objects of negative public opinion.9 This sug-
gests that, in the absence of careful political management,
there exists a potential threat to immigration, the refugee
resettlement program, and the policy of multiculturalism
that have been the foundation of Australia’s ethnically plu-
ral society for most of the last three decades.
The discursive denigration of asylum seekers simultane-
ously fosters public hostility to them and creates the possi-
bility for them being handed over to private sector control
in which bottom-line considerations take precedence over
concerns such as justice, dignity, or rights. Distancing the
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“asylum seeker” from the “citizen” enables new punitive
regimes to be constructed and in ways that alleviate the
government of responsibility precisely because asylum
seekers are routinely regarded as being without rights be-
cause of their “criminal” conduct.10 The politics of legisla-
tive reform and the winding back of entitlements for asylum
seekers are, therefore, explored in this article, as are specific
issues arising from privatization of asylum-seeker care.
Neo-liberalism and the Politics of Identity in
Contemporary Australia
The re-election of the conservative Coalition government on
November 10th owed much to its uncompromising stance
on asylum seekers. Indeed, at polling booths voters were
greeted by posters of a stern-looking Prime Minister, stand-
ing at a lectern, fists clenched, with the words “We decide
who comes to this country and the circumstances in which
they come” emblazoned beneath his image.11 This continues
a political history in which the peaks and troughs of John
Howard’s career have coincided with interventions on iden-
tity issues. As Opposition leader during the later 1980s,
Howard was criticized for his public rumblings about the
growing number of Asians among immigrants arriving in
Australia and spoke out against the policy of multicultural-
ism which had enjoyed bipartisan support until he became
leader of the Opposition.12 Negativity within the Liberal
Party stirred up by his views was to cost Howard the leader-
ship of the party in May  1989. But as desperate for an
election victory as they were to find a leader that might
deliver it to them, the Liberals again turned to Howard in
1995 and he delivered office in early 1996. Having learned
from his earlier (bitter) experiences, Howard has proven to
be a shrewd if divisive manipulator of identity politics.
For example, the Coalition’s13 1996 election campaign
theme was “For All of Us”. The slogan implied, and Howard
argued, that Labor had long since stopped listening to
ordinary Australians and governed for cultural elites and
minorities. These included the arts community, indigenous
peoples, republicans, pro-Asianists, unionists, ethnic com-
munity lobbyists, and others whose visions for Australia
were at odds with Howard’s rather more traditional imag-
ining of a nation of relaxed, comfortable, and happy nuclear
families. However, opponents of the Coalition, especially
indigenous Australians, quickly interpreted the slogan to
mean, “For All of Us (but Not Them)”.
In government, John Howard was very slow to condemn
the 1996 maiden parliamentary speech of independent MP
Pauline Hanson. The speech, xenophobic and often factu-
ally inaccurate, argued that indigenous people occupied a
privileged place in Australian society and that harm was
being done to Australia by immigration and the policy of
multiculturalism. In the days following her incendiary
comments, Howard observed that: “I thought some of the
things that she said were an accurate reflection of what
people feel.” For weeks, Howard defended Hanson on the
grounds of free speech despite the absurdity of many of her
allegations and claims.14 The government also desperately
sought ways to limit native title claims arising from High
Court decisions recognizing native title in 1992 and 1996.
Its public (scare) campaign included a celebrated incident
where Howard was interviewed on television holding a map
of Australia with large tracts of the continent shaded to
demonstrate the alleged threat to “backyards” that native
title implied.15
The Howard government’s second term, perhaps tem-
pered by a greatly reduced majority, was less explosive,
though eventful.
However, the decision to put asylum seekers somewhere
near the centre of an election campaign (albeit in the lan-
guage of “defending Australia’s borders”) marks a signifi-
cant shift in tactics on the part of the Australian
government. Not only does it officially encourage a kind of
empathy fatigue among existing Australian citizens and
residents (including former asylum seekers and refugees),
it follows upon legislative reforms that reduce the rights of
asylum seekers to legal remedies and extend Common-
wealth powers of interdiction at sea. Moreover, the ferocity
of the public backlash encountered by the Labor Opposi-
tion when it raised questions about aspects of the govern-
ment’s legislative response led it to support the Border
Protection Bill in an attempt to salvage its dwindling elec-
toral prospects. Arguably, the treatment of asylum seekers,
particularly their mandatory detention, is now less open to
challenge than at any time in the recent past.16 Yet, the lack
of scrutiny of a policy pursued by only three other countries
in the world, Greece, Turkey, and Poland, coincides with
mounting evidence of ethical and other problems with the
management of immigration detention centres by the pri-
vately owned firm, Australasian Correctional Management
Pty Ltd (ACM).17
The Discursive Construction of Incarceration
How have these most desperate of people been so completely
dehumanized that, at the height of the “Tampa crisis,” dif-
ferent callers to talk-back radio in Australia called for them
to be shot or forcibly restrained by the administration of
sedative drugs? Arguably, the work of denigrating asylum
seekers draws upon enduring historical narratives of threats
from the north. Contemporary government discourses of
danger (to Australian security) and management (of the
human threats to sovereignty) merely burnish old fears and
give them new focus.
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The arrival of asylum seekers in growing but modest
numbers from the mid-1990s onwards partly fulfills the
self-constructed nightmare of “invasion.” That they arrive
in relatively small numbers, unarmed, and with few re-
sources, is irrelevant.18 Their presence both nourishes and
adds to the deeply embedded cultural fear of invasion. And,
under the circumstances of perceived externally derived
threat to national and personal security, a surprisingly viru-
lent hostility emerges in public discourse. David Walker has
most impressively explored the long history of invasion
fears in his book Anxious Nation where he notes the use of
metaphors of flood and inundation a century ago, but with
respect to the Chinese.19 Moreover, in the context of con-
temporary asylum seekers, his comments concerning late
nineteenth century fears remain apt:
By the 1880s it was commonplace to depict Asia as a world of
huge populations ‘teeming’ with a terrible energy. Asia was a
force about to engulf the world’s underpopulated zones. Added
to these powerful stereotypes was the theme of a malign Oriental
intelligence, patiently manoeuvring for advantage…20
Interestingly, among the most powerfully negative images of
asylum seekers is that of the queue jumper, an expression
routinely used by the government and media alike. It too
resonates with the view of the Asian other as having a malign
and advantage-seeking intelligence that offends the ordered
and justice-seeking ways of (white) Australians. But Ghassan
Hage reminds us that Asians are not always constructed
as cool and calculating in their designs on Australia. In-
deed, in the context of a discussion of Geoffrey Blainey’s
controversial book All for Australia (1984), Hage refers to
the image of an “irrational” (Asian) tide bearing down
upon Australia:
It is their lack of rationality, compared to the White Australian,
which constitutes them into such dangerous ‘unthinking mat-
ter’ inexorably moving to overtake Australia and which no
reasoned argument can stop.21
Australian  literature has  also been  liberally  sprinkled
with invasion scenarios, including John Marsden’s Tomor-
row When the War Began, a novel aimed at teenagers that
has been reprinted twenty-six times since being published
in 1994.22 Even during the years of so-called Asian engage-
ment, Australians were presented with the rather stark
alternative of dealing with Asia on its own terms, or simply
being left behind in the scramble for economic develop-
ment.23 The same images of being overwhelmed, swamped,
diluted, or disappeared by Asian economic power are sum-
moned as they are in more specifically racially motivated
fears of military invasion. As former Labor immigration
minister, Nick Bolkus, observes:
This is a frightened country … For decades now we’ve been
afraid of someone invading us from somewhere and I think that
mentality still permeates much of the country. It is amazing the
cross-section of the people who are infiltrated with this fear, the
degree of xenophobia that exists as well, and envy.24
However, these remarks need elaboration because it is
not a fear of all foreigners seeking refuge in Australia that
pervades imaginings of invasion. That the panic is moti-
vated by race and religious concerns and the image of the
boat is demonstrated by the absence from detention centers
of the two most numerous groups of “illegals,” British and
American nationals who have overstayed their visas and
who constitute 20 per cent of “illegals.”25 Tracing the asy-
lum-seeker issue through two Australian broadsheets, the
Brisbane Courier Mail and the Sydney Morning Herald,
between January 1997 and December 1999, Sharon Picker-
ing’s summary of the images used clearly relates the con-
temporary issue of asylum seekers to more traditional fears
of Asian invasion:
According to the BCM and SMH we are soon to be ‘awash’,
‘swamped’, ‘weathering the influx’, of ‘waves’, ‘latest waves’,
‘more waves’, ‘tides’, ‘floods’, ‘migratory flood’, ‘mass exodus’
of ‘aliens’, ‘queue jumpers’, ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘people smug-
glers’, ‘boat people’, ‘jumbo people’ ‘jetloads of illegals’, ‘illegal
foreigners’, ‘bogus’ and ‘phoney’ applicants, and ‘hungry
Asians’ upon ‘our shores’, ‘isolated coastlines’, and ‘deserted
beaches’, that make up the ‘promised land’, the ‘land of hope’,
the ‘lucky country’, ‘heaven’, ‘the good life’, ‘dream destina-
tion’, and they continue to ‘slip through’, ‘sneak in’, ‘gathering
to our north’, ‘invade’ with ‘false papers’ or ‘no papers’, ‘exotic
diseases’, ‘sicknesses’ as part of ‘gangs’, ‘criminal gangs’, ‘triads’,
‘organized crime’, and ‘Asian crime’. In response, ‘we’ should
have ‘closed doors’, only sometimes having ‘open doors’, we
should respond with the ‘navy and armed services at the ready’,
‘we’ should ‘send messages’, ‘deter’, ‘lock up’, and ‘detain’, ‘we’
should not be ‘exploited’, ‘played for a fool’, be seen as ‘gullible’
or be a ‘forelock-tugging serf’.26
Since Pickering’s article was published in mid-2001, two
Australian ministers have supplemented the list with refer-
ences to terrorists. On September 14, the Minister for De-
fence, Peter Reith, linked the refusal to land the Afghans on
the Tampa and the more general “…clamp-down on bor-
der protection against boat people….with efforts to combat
terrorism.”27 Four days later, on September 18, the Junior
Minister for Finance, Peter Slipper, said: “There is an un-
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deniable linkage between illegals and terrorists…be-
cause…some of those people come from the country that
is the centre of terror.” Asked by journalists for evidence of
this linkage, Slipper simply observed that because the so-
called illegals were from the Taliban’s Afghanistan, it was
“…not beyond the realms of possibility…” that some asy-
lum seekers may have been involved in terrorist activity.28
The undeniable link would appear in the context of the
Minister’s own words to be rather more in the realms of
speculation and hearsay.
Recent hostility towards Muslim asylum seekers has also
been worsened by a spate of rapes in Sydney attributed to
Lebanese (Muslim) Australians whose victims were alleg-
edly targeted for being “Australian.”29 Journalist Paul Shee-
han’s comments on Muslim immigrants, poverty, crime,
and violence led to an angry response from another Sydney
Morning Herald journalist, Nadia Jamal, a Lebanese-Aus-
tralian.30 The fact  that both used statistical evidence to
support contradictory arguments is indicative of the com-
plexities of employing “science” to make sustainable claims
about ethnicity. This is partly because fear, perhaps the
most significant response aroused by the presence of immi-
grants and asylum seekers, is not amenable to empirical
resolution and yet, like pain, when one is in its grip it can
be overwhelming.31 And, in this instance, fear is shadowed by
anger in the form of “…growing anti-Muslim paranoia.”32
But the presence of increasing numbers of Muslims in
Australia is, arguably, partly an unintended consequence of
U.S. support for and arming of Islamic opposition to the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan that eventually led to the
emergence of the Taliban and its aggressive opposition to
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Moreover, the deregula-
tion of Australia’s economy and labour market over the last
two decades has created a pervasive sense of insecurity in
some sections of Australian society. Ironically, the Coali-
tion government has probably gone further than its prede-
cessors in promoting the alleged social benefits of economic
deregulation even when it has meant economic pain and
social dislocation. However, it has proven far more reluc-
tant to renegotiate the fundamentals of what it means to be
Australian in identity debate. Thus, unstructured, unregu-
lated, and incalculable numbers of potential asylum seeker
arrivals, a form of “globalisation from below” as Australian
cultural theorist McKenzie Wark describes it, threaten the
government’s control over identity issues. The very pres-
ence of the asylum seeker’s body is a critique of national
sovereignty and the trade inequalities and developing world
indebtedness that seems to be one feature of increasing
globalization. The greater the inequalities in global trade,
the more people join the flows of human beings escaping
economic and political hardship. But discourses, such as
those of some anti-globalization sentiment, that attempt to
reassert the primacy of states cannot contribute to stem-
ming the flow of people to the more privileged nations
unless they systematically address the structural inequali-
ties of the global economy. On this view, the effectiveness
of political and economic barriers to outsiders erected by
privileged nations will continue to be undermined because
they recreate the very circumstances which lead to people
fleeing entrenched disadvantage and the political violence
characteristic of inequality. As Wark argues:
The most telling human critique of globalisation is not the
black-clad protestors in Seattle or Genoa, it is the still, silent
bodies of the illegals, in ships, trucks, car boots, passing through
the borders. The placeless proletariat.33
But, Wark notes, missing from what he calls the new
global disorder is a way to make a claim to a right outside
of the space of the nation-state. The stateless refugee simul-
taneously speaks of the presence of states failing in basic
duties to citizens and the failure of other states to acknow-
ledge responsibility for victims of the former.
In Australia, two factors have combined to enhance ten-
sions about asylum seekers and immigration more gener-
ally. Firstly, it was during the 1980s that deregulation of the
Australian economy commenced in earnest. This led to
general erosion of wages and conditions as a result of the
so-called Accords between successive Labor governments
and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and
to periods of high unemployment, high interest rates, and
general feelings of insecurity in the Australian polity. Sec-
ondly, in the ten years prior to Labor’s assuming office in
early 1983, immigration from Asia accounted for approxi-
mately 21 per cent of the total, whereas in the ten years
between 1983 and 1992 it accounted for more than 41 per
cent.34 However, the overall size of the immigration intake
did not increase greatly, rising only from 1,008,376 during
the decade 1970–79 (including a post-World War II high
of 185,325 in 1970) to 1,068,128 during the decade
1980–89. Moreover, very few asylum seekers arrived by
boat between 1982 and late 1989.35 On this view, the ten-
sions surrounding asylum seekers are an admixture to feel-
ings of economic insecurity and the altered ethnic mix of the
annual immigration intake rather than its increased size.
Supporters of Labor’s attempts to broaden and deepen
ties with Asia warned from the later 1980s onwards that it
had failed to explain the alleged benefits of deregulation,
immigration, and multiculturalism to the public. Feelings
of insecurity about the future were intensified by threats to
key institutions of the federation social contract, such as
centralized wage fixing, and in the context of the bust that
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followed the 1980s boom. All this occurred at a time of
growing unease, fostered by opponents of immigration and
multiculturalism, about the numbers of Vietnamese, Cam-
bodians, and Lebanese in the immigration intake.36 None-
theless, and despite growing public discord with Labor’s
immigration policy, then Prime Minister Paul Keating ar-
gued forcefully against sporadic claims that Australia was
being Asianized, saying in 1994: “We do not, and cannot aim,
to be ‘Asian’ or European or anything else but Australians.”37
However, it was also in 1994 that the Keating Govern-
ment introduced mandatory detention for asylum seekers
after a brief period where unauthorized arrivals escalated.
These were mainly Cambodians, Iraqis, and Afghans.
Whilst the power to detain resided in the 1958 Migration
Act, the move to mandatory detention reflected the then
government’s view that refugee advocates were making
excessive use of court processes to prevent the removal of
asylum seekers whose claims for refugee status had failed.
The idea of mandatory detention was to deter unauthorized
arrivals.38
With the defeat of the Keating Government in 1996 came
major changes, particularly in the context of Keating’s im-
age of Australia’s as a confident, outward looking, cosmo-
politan middle power. With “For All of Us,” the Coalition
touched upon an aggrieved sense in the community and
shifted the focus of debates from Keating’s so called big
picture to an idea of “…security [that] has functioned…as
a drive for historical, strategic, economic and ontological
certitude.”39
In this environment, and ominously for asylum seekers,
major dilemmas of justice and identity are reduced to tasks
of management.40 In a broad critique of John Rawls and
others who subscribe to what she calls virtue theories of
politics, Bonnie Honig warns that anxieties arising from
confrontations with political subjects that do not conform
to ordered political institutions are intolerant and contrib-
ute to processes that reduce politics to administration and
communitarian consolidation.41 Privatization of asylum-
seeker welfare is made possible because government attacks
on people that it calls “illegals,” “queue jumpers,” or “bogus
refugees” implies their breach of administrative process
and their abuse of the Refugee Convention, removing the
need for government involvement. The criminalization of
asylum seekers mitigates public sympathy and, simultane-
ously, brings into disrepute the Convention that protects
asylum seekers. Sections of the media contribute to the
denigration of the Refugee Convention by describing Aus-
tralia’s international treaty obligations as, for example, the
“UN loophole,” implying covert government conspiracies
to admit asylum seekers or by calling upon extremist critics
who provide profoundly negative assessments of asylum
seekers.42 Front-page headlines such as the Melbourne Her-
ald-Sun’s “Alien Scam” sum up the negative impact the
media can have on a political issue fraught with racialized
fears.43
Privatizing Detention
In April 1997, the Australian government sought proposals
for the detention and management of people detained under
the Migration Act from seventeen selected organizations.
Australasian Correctional Management (ACM), a wholly
owned subsidiary of the U.S.-owned Wackenhut Correc-
tions Corporation, won the tender. The middle and upper
management of the parent company, Wackenhut, is largely
composed of former FBI and CIA operatives and the com-
pany has been subjected to a U.S. congressional investiga-
tion for its practices. It has also been connected to chemical
and biological weapons producing consortiums.44 However,
the overall range of Wackenhut’s activities is so extensive as
to be beyond the scope of this article.45 The company’s
founder, former FBI agent George Wackenhut, apparently
a great believer in incarceration, observed in a documentary
aired on Australian television in late 2000 that: “They’re
[Australia] really starting to punish people, as they should
have all along. This year we are going to make $US400
million.”46 It is not clear whether Wackenhut’s comments
are squarely directed at asylum seekers in detention in ACM
facilities but it is a disturbing picture of Wackenhut’s under-
standing of the purposes of this aspect of his business. But it
also conforms to the view, currently popular, if not encour-
aged by the Australian government, that asylum seekers
ought to be punished.
ACM owns and operates six detention centres around
Australia, in which are held approximately 3500 asylum
seekers, including children, who account for about one-
third of the detainees. In July 2001, it was reported that the
profits of ACM had increased 350 per cent in two years on
the back of increased numbers of asylum seekers reaching
Australian shores. Annual turnover for ACM is A$200 mil-
lion, making Australia’s Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, Wackenhut’s third-largest cus-
tomer.47 As a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign corpo-
ration, ACM is not obliged to disclose detailed operating
accounts, meaning it is difficult to determine what percent-
age of its operating revenue and profits are derived from the
ownership and  operation  of the  immigration detention
centres compared to its prison operations. However,
ACM’s profits increased from A$4.1 million in 1998, to
A$7.5 million in 1999, to A$14.75 million in 2000, and the
rate of increase of profit more closely parallels the increase
in asylum seeker arrivals than growth in the prison popu-
lation under ACM’s control. ACM accounted for about 20
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per cent of Wackenhut’s gross revenues, 11 per cent of its
consolidated revenues, and almost 50 per cent of Wacken-
hut Corrections Corporation’s profit of US$19 million in
2000. The Minister for Immigration, Philip Ruddock, ac-
knowledged that the growth in ACM’s profits was a result
of an increase in the numbers of asylum seekers reaching
Australian shores in 2000.48
ACM’s ability to make refugee detention profitable
partly arises from its capacity to operate detention centres
at a lower per-head cost than the government. For example,
it has reduced the daily management cost of asylum seekers
to  approximately  A$112  per day, down from a high of
A$145 per day immediately before the Commonwealth
handed control to the private sector in November 1997.
Financial effectiveness, rather than the welfare of asylum
seekers, has featured prominently in government discourse
in favour of the privatized centres. For example, the per-
formance measures of dignity and privacy have been re-
moved from publicly available records concerning the
contracts between ACM and the Commonwealth, and
Freedom of Information requests on these issues have been
denied for reasons of commercial confidentiality.49 On this
view, the profitability of ACM and the Australian govern-
ment’s desire to reduce the costs of compliance with the
Refugee Convention take precedence over the needs and
rights of asylum seekers. Indeed, notwithstanding ACM’s
first right of refusal on the three-year contracts to run the
detention centres and its desire to continue providing the
service, the Australian government has invoked a clause in
the agreement with ACM allowing it to tender for a new
service provider on the grounds that ACM’s offer is not
financially competitive. This is an exercise described by the
Minister for Immigration as “…testing the market to ob-
tain best value for money…” and may see a new service
provider in the near future.50
But arguably, the related desires of the Australian gov-
ernment to save money and ACM’s desire to make it has
been costly in every sense of the word, a point emphasized
by the acting Commonwealth Ombudsman, Oliver Win-
der. In an investigation into the operation of the detention
centres, Winder found:
…evidence at every IDC [Immigration Detention Centre] of
self-harm, damage to property, fights and assaults, which sug-
gested there were systematic deficiencies in the management of
detainees…These observations raised serious concerns about
the standard of care being provided to detainees.51
Allegations of brutality, sexual assault, and other denials
of the rights of detainees have been common and have been
investigated, but out of the public domain. Indeed, Philip
Flood, the Chair of a departmental inquiry (the Minister
has consistently rejected calls for a judicial inquiry, presum-
ably because it would enable witnesses and perpetrators to
be subpoenaed and would offer protection to those that
wished to testify against ACM), was scathingly critical of the
handling of a series of serious allegations of impropriety
against ACM staff.52 Commercial confidentiality prevents
the public from knowing whether financial penalties were
applied to ACM and, if so, their extent.
A Parliamentary committee also visited the six camps
during 2001 and noted alleged assaults on detainees by
ACM staff, poor facilities, inadequate medical treatment,
and high levels of psychological anxiety arising from these
circumstances. As one (Labor) committee member ob-
served: “No one can visit these centres without being pro-
foundly moved, nothing prepares you for the visible
impact.” Rejecting the parliamentary committee’s recom-
mendation that detainees be released after fourteen weeks,
Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock, argued that com-
mittee members were “naïve” and lacked the life experience
to make such recommendations.53
Attempting to maintain the bottom line means that
ACM facilities also have particularly harsh security meas-
ures. For example, in Villawood Detention Centre in Syd-
ney, detainees are assembled four times a day and have to
produce their photographic id and passes.54 ACM officers,
with two-way radios turned up to maximum volume and
slamming doors behind them, check sleeping dormitories
each hour of the night, generally in an invasive and aggres-
sive manner, including shining torches in the faces of sleep-
ing detainees, adults and children alike. As one ACM
employee observed: “Yes, many of my fellow officers are
bastards to the detainees and treat them like dogs.” The
primary reason for this intrusiveness is to minimize escapes
as they attract financial penalties under performance targets
set by the Commonwealth.55 Moreover, ACM’s drive for
profits has contributed to its poor reputation with sections
of the non-government welfare community. For example,
when the Woomera detention centre was expanded, ACM
pressured charitable organizations to provide items such as
curtains and other materials associated with setting up the
facility, as well as clothing for the detainees. It did not offer
any payment for these goods, representing the detainees as
people in need and therefore as deserving of assistance by
the charities. At least one other commercial arrangement
with St. Vincent de Paul was not honoured by ACM.56
Minimizing costs, and the desire to maintain control
over the flow of information in and out of the centres, also
meant that they were very poorly equipped, particularly
early in ACM’s contract. Initially, children had no access to
recreational facilities, not even balls. Adults were denied
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access to any kind of media, were not allowed to send or
receive letters or to make or receive phone calls, and en-
dured inadequate facilities as numbers in the centres
swelled with new arrivals. Boredom has been noted as
central to the regular bouts of protest and occasional vio-
lence in the camps.57 At least one recent review of ACM
facilities indicates that they remain grossly inadequate.58
Medical care of asylum seekers may also be compro-
mised by the imperative to keep costs under control. For
example, a local doctor contracted to provide care to
Woomera detainees noted that the dispensary at the camp
did not fill at least one prescription he provided to an
inmate because the drug was regarded as excessively expen-
sive. The same doctor registered his concern that the intra-
venous administration of a particularly strong sedative to
an agitated detainee by nurses took them out of their skills
depth and was done in a clinic in which proper monitoring
facilities were not available.59
The inability of the media and other non-government
organizations to access detention centres means that it is
difficult to determine how economic demands shapes day-
to-day policy in the centres. But rioting, hunger strikes,
instances of self-harm at the camps, and the tales of misery
told by former detainees indicate that there are many prob-
lems in the centres. Perhaps a policy of mandatory deten-
tion will inevitably produce problems of violence and
unhappiness, but the profitability of ACM suggests that far
more could be done to ease the anxiety and enhance the
personal security and welfare of asylum seekers. Indeed,
ACM also benefits from the undervalued labour of de-
tainees, paying them approximately one-quarter of what
the general prison population earns for similar work.
Twelve hours labour may earn an asylum seeker a phone
card worth $15 or $20.60 A six-hour shift in the kitchen may
pay A$10–15 or a day cleaning latrines A$5.61 Arguably, this
practice is possible only because ACM is using what it calls
“non-citizens” to undertake  this work  and  because few
people in Australia have raised objections, the union move-
ment having been noticeably silent on the issue of asylum
seekers. Given that ACM is a profit-making concern, the
use of labour that is not properly recompensed raises seri-
ous ethical questions.
There seems little doubt that despite government claims
of taxpayer value for money in the detention and care of
asylum seekers, the market has not been kind to asylum
seekers themselves. They are compulsorily detained in fa-
cilities that at least two government-commissioned inquir-
ies have condemned as inadequate. Their welfare is at least
partly measured in terms of corporate profit. Perhaps of
greatest concern is the fact that by placing the market
between itself and asylum seekers, the Australian govern-
ment, and the people it represents, can be shielded from the
moral questions that might be raised by the policy of man-
datory detention primarily in the context of commercial
confidentiality.
The “crime” of asylum seekers is to have arrived in
Australia without appropriate visas and other identity
documents. This is a situation that British Home Secretary
Jack Straw acknowledges arises from the fundamental con-
tradiction in the Refugee Convention that confers a right to
apply for asylum but fails to impose a corresponding obli-
gation on the part of governments to admit asylum seekers
to enable them to exercise the right.62 Thus, arguably, the
most vulnerable of people find themselves not only stateless
and in an uncertain legal realm but in the hands of a
company whose primary concern must, by definition, be
the making of a profit from their incarceration. Protecting
itself from the financial penalties that would have arisen
from the breakout of rioting detainees at the Woomera
detention centre in August 2000 dictated that employees of
ACM use water cannon and tear gas on detainees, the only
times in Australian history that such measures have been
used against rioters.63 This is a stark reminder of the gulf
between the treatment of citizens and “non-citizens” in
contemporary Australia.
Legislative “Reform” and Electoral Politics
in the Wake of the Tampa
A Conservative political commentator and a former senior
member of John Howard’s staff, Gerard Henderson, notes
that in neither of two major foreign policy addresses in
August in which the government’s third-term agenda was
outlined were refugees or asylum seekers mentioned by the
Prime Minister.64 Nonetheless, when the decision was taken
to refuse the Tampa permission to disembark its 438 asylum
seekers later in August, the government took an opportunity
not only to reinvigorate its electoral standing, but to draft
new legislation in an attempt to deter asylum seekers. In
sending the SAS to take control of the Tampa and in refusing
to allow the asylum seekers to set foot on Australian soil
(which would automatically invoke the Migration Act), the
government argued that it was operating within the law.
Whilst there was some division on this point, it was generally
regarded that the government was within its rights.65 How-
ever, on August 29th, it introduced the Border Protection Bill
into the Parliament in  an attempt  to  shore  up  its legal
position and ensure that it was in breach of no laws. The
legislation was to be retrospective and was to give the gov-
ernment the following powers, not just in respect to the
Tampa, but all subsequent ships carrying asylum seekers.
Firstly, the government sought the power to remove any
ship, without reason, from Australian waters. Secondly, the
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bill authorized the use of reasonable force to remove a ship.
Thirdly, officers using such force and the Commonwealth
itself were to be immune from criminal or civil prosecution
arising from its use. Fourthly, no decision to remove a ship
from Australian waters was to be subject to judicial review.
The bill also removed, for the purposes of migration, Ash-
more reef (approximately 220 miles from the Australian
mainland) and Christmas Island from territories mandated
as Australia.66 Simon Evans from the Faculty of Law at
Melbourne University argued that the bill was dangerous
on several grounds and publicly appealed to Members of
the House of Representatives and to Senators not to adopt
the bill in its original form. Among his concerns was the
lack of opportunity to scrutinize the bill with respect to the
use of force. He also noted that the discretion conferred on
agencies of the Commonwealth to use force was absolute.
He observed that there was an absence of preconditions for
the use of force (including there being no requirement that
instructions to leave Australian waters be understood by a
ship’s master, assuming there was one, and no requirement
to check the seaworthiness of the vessel or the health of
those on board). He also raised concerns about the absence
of judicial review of decisions to remove ships or boats from
Australian waters and argued the legislation probably did
not comply with Australia’s obligations under the Refugee
Convention.67
Labor, having supported the government up to this time,
opposed the legislation in its original form because it ex-
tended Commonwealth powers and combined with Aus-
tralian Democrats and a Greens senator to defeat it in the
Senate.
Meanwhile, the government engaged in a flurry of dip-
lomatic activity. It attempted to engage Indonesia with the
problem but failed as the Indonesian President, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, allegedly furious at John Howard’s public
comments on Indonesia’s responsibility for the asylum
seekers, refused to take or return the calls of the Australian
Prime Minister.68 Indeed, the Indonesian Foreign Minister,
Hassan Wirayuda, accused the federal government of turn-
ing “…the issue of illegal immigrants into a political com-
modity…”69 Australia’s relations with Norway also quickly
deteriorated into mutual and public criticism.70 The
UNHCR criticized the government’s decision and actions
but was quickly rebuffed by the Prime Minister.71 However,
as early as August 30th, the Australian Foreign Minister,
Alexander Downer, contacted Sergio Vieira de Mello, the
UN’s chief administrator in East Timor, and requested that
a refugee camp be made available to house the 438 asylum
seekers still stranded on the deck of the Tampa. The UN
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, quickly intervened and ve-
toed the plan.72
Finally, on September 1, the government achieved the
breakthrough it had sought. Nauru, the world’s smallest
republic with a population of just twelve thousand and
notable for being an impoverished and ravaged former
phosphate mine, was effectively bribed by the Australian
government to accept the asylum seekers for processing.
John  Howard  described this as “…a truly Pacific  solu-
tion…,” a statement of some audacity given that less than
a month prior to the arrival of the Tampa, Howard had
refused to attend the annual Pacific Islands Forum, held in
Nauru.73 The Australian government signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding guaranteeing Nauru diesel to fuel
the island’s generators at a cost of about A$13m per month
until May 2002. Debts of A$1 million owed to Australian
hospitals by citizens of Nauru were cancelled. The number
of sporting and education scholarships provided to resi-
dents was doubled from ten to twenty and infrastructure
assistance for maritime surveillance, telecommunications,
and its airline were promised.74 As a result of this deal, the
asylum seekers were transferred from the MV Tampa to
HMAS Manoora on September 3rd. Having been refused
permission to transship the asylum seekers through Dili,
the Manoora sailed for Pt. Moresby in Papua New Guinea.
Back in Australia, lawyer Eric Vadarlis and the Victorian
Civil Liberties Council brought similar but separate actions
in the Federal Court challenging the legality of the govern-
ment’s actions. On September 11 Justice North found that
the asylum seekers had been illegally detained on the MV
Tampa after their rescue on August 26. He instructed the
Manoora, which by now had picked up a second group of
mainly Iraqi asylum seekers, to return to Australia and
disembark all the asylum seekers for processing.75 However,
the government appealed and on September 18th, the court
overturned the decision of Justice North, arguing that the
government indeed had the right to refuse entry to the
asylum seekers. Significantly perhaps, the Chief Justice dis-
sented in a 2–1 decision. However, the decision became
redundant when Labor, having seen its electoral support
plummet after opposing the original Border Protection Bill,
agreed on September 18 to support it with minor amend-
ments. These were that a vessel could only be returned to
sea if it was seaworthy and that officers of the Common-
wealth had to act in good faith and use no more force than
was warranted if they were to avoid judicial scrutiny of their
actions.76 In keeping with the government’s concern with
bottom line issues, it argues that one of the key aspects to
its new legislation is reduction of costs  associated with
detention and processing of asylum seekers.77
The political imperative of recapturing or neutralizing
the 936,621 voters (8.43 per cent of the votes cast) that
supported Pauline  Hanson’s  One Nation Party  with its
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1998 election policies of zero immigration and temporary
protection visas for refugees partly explains Labor’s falling
into line behind the government. In short, the Coalition
proved itself willing to open up deep social divisions in the
quest for electoral support and comprehensively out-
flanked Labor. Polling in the lead-up to the November 10
election showed that many former One Nation voters indi-
cated their support for the Coalition. Indeed, as Margot
Kingston notes in her analysis of the official Liberal Party
campaign launch:
Only one other politician made it into the  Howard snaps
beamed onto the wall behind the podium before the speeches
began. Philip Ruddock. He made it twice – Howard and Rud-
dock together, smiling in a sea of white faces on the street…It’s
the election winner alright, the boat people. What made my skin
crawl was the thrill John Howard, Philip Ruddock and the
Liberal crowd got from them…blood lust. Victory is ours.78
Most of Australia’s political journalists writing during
the campaign concluded that through the “Tampa crisis”
the government managed to recapture the vast bulk of One
Nation supporters.79 On this view, it is not surprising that
Liberal party polling data shows Philip Ruddock is one of
the government’s most respected and admired ministers
because of his consistent tough line on asylum seekers.
Indeed, this information, which long precedes the appear-
ance of the Tampa on the Australian horizon, may indicate
the government’s nascent awareness of the political possi-
bilities of a calculated assault on asylum seekers and their
rights. Peter Mares, author of a recent book on the treat-
ment of refugees and asylum seekers in Australia, observes:
“I come reluctantly to the conclusion that Mr Ruddock is
one of the government’s frontline players in the shabby
politics of division.”80
John Howard argues that it is in the Australian national
interest that a line be drawn in the sand because of “…what
is increasingly becoming an uncontrollable number of ille-
gal arrivals.”81 But “uncontrollable” far better describes the
circumstances that lead to many Afghans and Iraqis fleeing
their homes for the often expensive and highly dangerous
flight to Australia by boat. Any attempt to control the flow
of asylum seekers entails a meaningful engagement with the
political and social circumstances that uproot people. In the
unlikely event of that occurrence, an alternative would be
the investment of reasonable resources much closer to the
point of origin of asylum seekers so that their claims can be
processed more expeditiously than is currently the case.
The honorary Afghan consul in Australia, Mahmoud Sai-
kal, likens securing a place through formal channels in the
present system to winning a lottery.82 The enduring irony
of the current situation is that the Australian government,
through the so-called Pacific Solution, is now engaged in
precisely the people trafficking it claims to abhor.
Conclusion
Asylum seekers reaching Australian shores have been sub-
jected to a policy of mandatory detention since 1994 and
have been in the hands of the private sector since late 1997.
The policy of detaining all asylum seekers who arrive with-
out appropriate documentation is pursued by only a small
minority of countries and is a policy that concerns refugee
advocate groups and the UNHCR. Despite government
claims to the contrary, Australia is not unusually generous
in the context of the numbers of refugees it resettles. In the
context of comparatively small numbers of unauthorized
arrivals compared to many other countries, mandatory de-
tention of asylum seekers is not only a harsh response to
vulnerable and often traumatized people, but also is central
to a discursive regime of criminalization. Moreover, that
asylum seekers are detained in sometimes remote and cli-
matically inhospitable locations and in facilities routinely
criticized for their poor quality demonstrates the distinctly
regressive and punitive nature of the policy.
The Howard government’s persistent arguments  that
value for money is important in managing asylum seekers
is indicative of the prioritization of bottom-line considera-
tions over basic human rights. Privatization of public utili-
ties and other government services has generally been
represented as legitimate to citizens not only because the
service is provided more cheaply, but because the service is
of a higher standard. The latter argument has not been
made with respect to the welfare of asylum seekers. How-
ever, the capacity to transfer the care of asylum seekers from
the state to the private sector arises in a broader historical
context of hostility to perceived threats to Australian sov-
ereignty and security arising in the north. While demoni-
zation of Asian “invaders” was routine in Australian
political discourse from the middle decades of the nine-
teenth century, in the context of a more diverse and mul-
ticultural Australia, after about 1970, both major parties
avoided blatant politicization of community concerns
about immigration and multiculturalism. The Howard
government has decisively broken with that bipartisanship
and has been willing to place potential electoral gain ahead
of the maintenance of social cohesion and the welfare of
asylum seekers.
Government and media representations of asylum seek-
ers as queue jumpers, illegals, bogus refugees and so on,
have served to foment empathy fatigue among Australian
citizens. Moreover, representations of asylum seekers as
making unreasonable and extravagant claims upon Austra-
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lia and Australians, see them lumped together with other
members of the so-called politically correct community in
neo-liberal identity politics discourse. On this view, asylum
seekers become another vector of UN “interference” in
Australian affairs, a particularly sensitive issue given the
UN’s criticisms of the Howard government’s policies to-
wards indigenous peoples and women’s rights. Successful
denigration of asylum seekers as criminals and cheats not
only enables the government to distance itself from their
claims for consideration for residency in and citizenship of
Australia, it brings the UN and the Refugee Convention
into disrepute. At a time when the numbers of peoples of
concern to the UN exceed twenty million, this development
in an advanced and prosperous Western liberal democracy
is  of concern. Moreover, should countries like Canada,
Britain, the U.S., and Germany follow the politically popu-
lar example set by Australia and forcibly close their borders,
the already fragile architecture of global refugee manage-
ment could suffer serious harm, particularly if poorer
countries are saddled with even greater numbers of dis-
placed peoples.
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